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ARTICLES
PATENT PRACTICE: STRATEGIES FOR
SUBMITING NEWLY DISCOVERED PRIOR
ART AFTER ALLOWANCE OF AN
APPLICATION
Stephen C. Sheart
William S. Gallianit
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent prosecutors1 continually encounter the problem of
treating material references2 discovered late in the prosecution3 of a
patent application, particularly, the problem of treating references
discovered after the claims4 have been allowed5 or after the applica-
tion has issued6 as a patent.
Copyright @ 1990 by Stephen C. Shear and William S. Galliani
t Mr. Shear is presently an intellectual property consultant. At the time this paper
was written he was a partner at Flehr, Hohbach, Test, Albritton & Herbert, San Francisco,
California.
t J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., BS.E.E., Northwestern Univer-
sity; registered to practice before the United States Patent & Trademark Office.
1. As used herein, "patent prosecutor" refers to any of the individuals indicated in 37
C.F.R. § 1.31 (1990); that section provides: "An applicant for patent may file and prosecute
his or her own case, or he or she may be represented by a registered attorney, registered
agent, or other individual authorized to practice before the Patent and Trademark Office in
patent cases."
2. See infra pp. 3-4.
3. As used herein, "prosecution" refers to the activities undertaken pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 131 (1989); that section provides: "The Commissioner [of Patents] shall cause an
examination to be made of the application [for patent] and the alleged new invention; and if
on such examination it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the
Commissioner shall issue a patent therefor."
4. "An applicant for a patent must include in his application one or more claims
which set forth the parameters of the invention. These claims measure the invention for
determining patentability both during examination and after issuance when validity is chal-
lenged. They also determine what constitutes infringement." 1 CHISUM, PATENTS, G1-3
(1989).
5. "If the examiner determines that a claim in a patent application meets the condi-
tions of patentability, he so notifies the applicant. After final action on other claims, the
application is in a condition for allowance and in due course will issue as a patent upon
payment of the prescribed issue fee." 1 CHISUM, PATENTS, Gl-l (1989).
6. "If the examination procedure determines that one or more claims in a patent appli-
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A patent prosecutor encounters these material references
through a variety of means, not the least of which is through the art
cited in a subsequently filed, corresponding European application.7
Typically, this particular prior art will be cited by the European
Patent Office approximately eighteen months after filing of the
United States application. At this juncture, the United States coun-
terpart application may be in condition for Allowance or may have
issued as a patent. The patent prosecutor is thereby faced with a
number of difficult questions.
This paper endeavors to explore the pragmatic options avail-
able to a patent prosecutor who has received a Notice of Allowance"
or an issued United States patent and who subsequently encounters
a reference which is material to the allowed or granted claims. The
paper first sets forth the general parameters of the prosecutor's duty
to disclose prior art as stipulated by 37 C.F.R. section 1.56 (herein-
after Rule 56); this section will also include consideration of possi-
ble forthcoming changes in the duty of disclosure under proposed
Rule 57. Next, the paper will apply the present and proposed duty
of disclosure to the period between receiving a Notice of Allowance
and formal issuance of the application. Finally, attention will focus
upon Reissue and Reexamination mechanisms as means for bring-
ing material references to the attention of the Patent Office after a
patent has issued; particularly, the pragmatic merits of each proce-
dure will be examined in light of various factual circumstances.
II. DUTY OF DISCLOSURE IN GENERAL
A patent is prosecuted in an ex parte proceeding before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office.9 Given the ex parte
nature of the proceeding, there is an important public interest
served by imposing upon a patent prosecutor a duty of candor in
cation are allowable, the Patent and Trademark Office will upon payment of the issue fee
issue the patent. On the issue date, the exclusive rights vest, and the seventeen-year term
commences." I CHISUM, PATENTS, GI-12 (1989).
7. "Implemented in 1977, this convention [the European Patent Convention] estab-
lishes a European Patent Office (EPO) in Munich, Germany. An application filed with the
EPO (which may be in English, French, or German) is searched and examined according to
substantive and procedural rules established in the convention and implementing regulations.
Once issued, a European patent acquires the status of a national patent in each of the member
nations which the applicant designates. Thus, the convention eases the burden of filing paral-
lel applications in a large number of countries." 1 CHISUM, PATENTS, GI-7, 8 (1989).
8. A Notice of Allowance is provided if an application meets the requirements of pat-
entability; specifically, 37 C.F.R. § 1.311 provides that "If, on examination, it shall appear
that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, a notice of allowance will be sent to
applicant .. "
9. See generally 3 CHIsuM, PATENTS, § 11.00 (1989).
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dealing with the Patent Office. A breach of this duty may occur
through misrepresentation or omission of material information; a
breach may also arise through bad faith or gross negligence."0 A
breach of this duty may result in the striking of an application from
the files of the Patent Office, invalidity or unenforceability of the
patent, a government suit to cancel the patent, an award of attor-
ney's fees in an infringement suit, or liability under the antitrust
laws, Federal Trade Commission Act or securities laws.11
A. Applicable Rules
1. 37 C.F.R. Section 1.56(a)
The general duty of the patent prosecutor to disclose material
information is set forth in 37 C.F.R. section 1.56(a) (hereinafter
Rule 56).12 The rule establishes that information is material where
there is a "[S]ubstantial likelihood that a reasonable Examiner
would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the appli-
cation to issue as a patent."
It should be emphasized that the rule does not impose a duty
to search for relevant prior art; rather, it imposes a duty of disclo-
sure only to that material which is known to the patent prosecutor
or other individuals substantively involved in the preparation or
prosecution of the application.13 While a prudent patent prosecutor
would generally like to perform a search prior to filing an applica-
tion, circumstances may prevent him from doing so. For instance,
in the computer software realm, to this juncture, relatively few pat-
10. 4 CHisUM, PATENTS, § 19.03, at 19-47 (1989).
11. Id. at 19-47, 48.
12. In its entirety, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1990) states:
A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark Office rests
on the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the
application and on every other individual who is substantively involved in the
preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the
inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to
assign the application. All such individuals have a duty to disclose to the
Office information they are aware of which is material to the examination of
the application. Such information is material where there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. The duty is commensu-
rate with the degree of involvement in the preparation or prosecution of the
application.
13. "Nor does an applicant for patent, who has no duty to conduct a prior art search,
have an obligation to disclose any art of which, in the court's words, he 'reasonably should be
aware.'" American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1362, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 763, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821.
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ents have issued.14 Thus, a prior art search may not be fruitful and
a patent prosecutor may intelligently decide not to undertake a
search, particularly in an undeveloped niche of computer software.
Also, as a practical matter, often there may be no time to conduct a
search and/or there may not be sufficient financial resources for a
search. Such circumstances often result in the discovery of relevant
art after Notice of Allowance.
a. Proposed Rule 57(b)
The Patent Office has proposed a new rule, Rule 57(b), to serve
as the standard for defining a patent prosecutor's duty of disclo-
sure.15 The proposed rule imposes a duty to disclose all information
"[W]hich that individual knows or should have known would
render unpatentable any pending claim." '16
This proposed standard embraces a "but for" standard of ma-
teriality which requires a conclusion that a pending claim would not
have been permitted to issue in a patent grant "but for" the misrep-
resentation, concealment' or otherwise culpable conduct with re-
spect to any fact.1 7 Whether the information meets the "but for"
standard of materiality is different than the present standard of
whether a reasonable Examiner would consider it important in de-
ciding the question of patentability. Under the proposed rule, the
inquiry focuses upon "[W]hether or not the information would
make a difference in the patentability of the claims if the informa-
tion had been properly disclosed and not misrepresented nor con-
cealed."' 8 The Patent Office believes that this "but for" standard of
materiality "[S]hould result in a more predictable duty of disclosure
14. See generally Soma, Software Trends" Who's Getting How Many of What? 1978 to
1987, 71 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 415 (1987).
15. See Duty of Disclosure and Practitioner Misconduct, 54 Fed. Reg. 11334 (March 17,
1989); reprinted in 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 923 at 533 (March 23,
1989) [hereinafter 54 Fed. Reg.].
The Patent Office has decided not to issue proposed Rule 57 as a final rule, and is instead
formulating a second proposal. Address of Commissioner Harry F. Manbeck, Jr. before the
ABA'a section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, 40 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 387, 388 (Aug. 30, 1990). Since this issue is still under consideration by the commis-
sioner, a discussion of proposed Rule 57 is included in this paper.
In skeletal form, the rule's subsections provide:
(a) Who has the duty to disclose,
(b) What information is required to be disclosed;
(c) Circumstances for action by the Office; and
(d) Misconduct - lack of candor and good faith.
16. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11340.
17.- 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11336.
18. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11336.
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because it is based on a statutory standard of patentability." 9
While the proposed rule contemplates a greater degree of mate-
riality, the Patent Office does not envision an anticipation standard:
"The information which is misrepresented or concealed need not
anticipate a pending claim to fall within the 'but for' standard of
materiality, but must, when added to other facts of record... pre-
clude the allowance of at least one pending claim in a patent."20 It
should be borne in mind that "[T]he proposed standard of material-
ity is included within the standard previously applied by the Office
(i.e., if an individual complied with the former standard, that indi-
vidual would comply with the proposed standard.)"2 Finally, as
under present practice,22 under proposed Rule 57, "An individual is
not obligated to conduct a prior art search nor furnish a negative
information disclosure statement.
23
2. 37 C.F.R. Section 1.97
Compliance with Rule 56 is facilitated through 37 C.F.R. sec-
tion 1.97 (hereinafter Rule 97). Rule 97 encourages applicants to
fie an information disclosure statement at the time of filing the ap-
plication or within the later of three months after the filing date of
the application or two months after applicant receives the filing re-
ceipt.24 This time frame is utilized to assure that the art is available
for the initial examination of the application.25
19. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11335. The test focuses on an objective standard of
patentability as opposed to the Rule 56 standard of what a reasonable Examiner would con-
sider important in deciding the issue of patentability.
20. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11337.
21. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11337.
22. See supra note 13.
23. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11338.
24. In its entirety, 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 states:
(a) As a means of complying with the duty of disclosure set forth in § 1.56,
applicants are encouraged to file an information disclosure statement at the
time of filing the application or within the later of three months after the filing
date of the application or two ironths after applicant receives the filing receipt.
If filed separately, the disclosure statement should, in addition to the identifica-
tion of the application, include the Group Art Unit to which the application is
assigned as indicated on the filing receipt. The disclosure statement may either
be separate from the specification or may be incorporated therein.
(b) A disclosure statement filed in accordance with paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion shall not be construed as a representation that a search has been made or
that no other material information as defined in § 1.56(a) exists.
25. For a critical view of this requirement, see generally Wegner, Inequitable Conduct
and the Proper Roles of Patent Attorney and Examiner in an Era of International Patent
Harmonization, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.A.Q.J. 38, 43-46 (1988).
1991]
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-a. Proposed Amended Rule 97
Under the Patent Office's proposed amended Rule 97, appli-
cants would be required to file information disclosure statements
within three months of the filing date of the application.26 The rule
would impose a fee of $200 for any statement fied after three
months.27 This fee would be waived if an explanatory statement is
filed indicating that the information disclosed was, within three
months prior to the date the statement is filed in the Patent Office,
either first cited by a foreign patent office in a counterpart foreign
application or first came to the attention of any person charged with
the duty of disclosure.28 In other words, the applicant is given three
months from the time of discovering a reference to file it with the
Patent Office. Thus, in the case of a subsequently discovered refer-
ence by foreign prosecution: "The date on the action by the foreign
patent office begins the three-month period in the same manner as
the mailing of an Office action starts a three-month shortened statu-
tory period for response."'29 This policy indicates that, "The Office
is willing to absorb any additional cost in considering such informa-
tion submitted three months after filing the application only when it
is clear that an applicant is diligent in providing the information to
the Office."30
3. 37 C.F.R. Section 1.98
The mechanics of filing an information disclosure statement
are addressed in 37 C.F.R. section 1.98 (hereinafter Rule 98).
Among other things, this rule enumerates that any disclosure state-
ment should include: (1) a listing of patents, publications or other
information; and (2) a concise explanation of the relevance of each
listed item.31  The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
26. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11334.
27. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11342.
28. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11342.
29. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11339.
30. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11339.
31. In its entirety, 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 states:
(a) Any disclosure statement filed under § 1.97 or § 1.99 shall include: (1) A
listing of patents, publications or other information; and (2) A concise explana-
tion of the relevance of each listed item. This disclosure statement shall be
accompanied by a copy of each listed patent or publication or other item of
information in written form or of at least the portions thereof considered by the
person filing the disclosure statement to be pertinent. All United States patents
listed should be identified by their patent numbers, patent dates and names of
the patentees. Each foreign published application or patent should be cited by
identifying the country or office which issued it, the document number and
publication date indicated on the document. Each printed publication should
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(MPEP)32 indicates that a concise explanation of the relevance of
each listed item:
may be nothing more than identification of the particular figure
or paragraph of the patent or publication which has some rela-
tion to the claimed invention. It might be a simple statement
pointing to similarities between the item of information and the
claimed invention.... It is thought that the explanation of rele-
vance will be useful to the Examiner and should not be signifi-
cantly burdensome for the applicant to prepare.33
As a practical matter, it is useful to clearly distinguish the cited
art. The MPEP provides, "It is permissible but not necessary to
discuss differences between the cited information and the claims."
'3 4
The MPEP guidelines indicate that the essence of the duty is merely
the disclosure of the materials; the Examiner will rely upon his in-
dependent assessment of the relevance of the art.
a. Proposed Amended Rule 98
"Under the proposed revision of Section 1.98, the administra-
tive details of supplying information to the Office are defined. For
the most part, these details remain unchanged from current prac-
tice, but the format and wording has been modified to provide
greater clarity."
35
4. 37 C.F.R. Section 1.99
An information disclosure statement is updated pursuant to 37
C.F.R. section 1.99 (hereinafter Rule 99). The rule states that
"[A]dditional information should be submitted to the Office with
reasonable promptness."36 The art may be included in a supple-
be identified by author (if any), title of the publication, pages, date and place of
publication. (b) When two or more patents or publications considered mate-
rial are substantially identical, a copy of a representative one may be included
in the statement and others merely listed. A translation of the pertinent por-
tions of foreign language patents or publications considered material should be
transmitted if an existing translation is readily available to the applicant.
32. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCE-
DURE (5th ed. 1983 rev. 1989) [hereinafter M.P.E.P.].
33. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Information Disclosure Statement, § 609(4), at 600-67.
34. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Information Disclosure Statement, § 609(4), at 600-67.
35. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11339.
36. In its entirety, 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 states:
If prior to issuance of a patent an applicant, pursuant to his or her duty of
disclosure under § 1.56, wishes to bring to the attention of the Office additional
patents, publications or other information not previously submitted, the addi-
tional information should be submitted to the Office with reasonable prompt-
ness. It may be included in a supplemental information disclosure statement or
1991]
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mental information disclosure statement or may be incorporated
into other communications to be considered by the Examiner.
It should be noted that the MPEP sanctions summary dismis-
sal of nonmaterial references cited in corresponding foreign files:
"A statement to the effect that an item is listed because it was cited
during the prosecution of a counterpart foreign application and is
not considered material to the examination of the U.S. application
is to be considered as satisfying the concise explanation requirement
of 37 C.F.R. Section 1.98(a). ' '37 Conversely, this statement may be
interpreted to impose a duty to at least disclose all foreign cited
references. Thus, even when a United States application has been
allowed, it is prudent to disclose prior art from a corresponding
foreign application which was cited merely as background art.
a. Proposed Amended Rule 99
Under the Patent Office proposal, Rule 99 would be eliminated
inasmuch as proposed Rule 97(f) would expand and revise the ex-
isting practice of filing supplemental information disclosure state-
ments under present Rule 99.38 Under the proposed Rule, any
information disclosure after the original must be in accordance with
proposed Rule 98.19 Such a statement will not be deemed timely if
it is filed after the mailing of an Examiner's final action or of a
Notice of Allowance.' The Patent Office has explained that: "It is
expected that an applicant will fie a continuing application to have
the Office consider pertinent prior art which comes to his or her
attention after final action or Notice of Allowance has been mailed
if the prior art affects the patentability of any claim."41 This provi-.
sion essentially eliminates after Allowance practice.42
B. Case Law Development
1. Genesis of Inequitable Conduct
The Rule 56 affirmative duty to cite prior art is a relatively
recent development. Traditionally, the Patent Office did not require
may be incorporated into other communications to be considered by the exam-
iner. Any transmittal of additional information shall be accompanied by expla-
nations of relevance and by copies in accordance with the requirements of
§ 1.98.
37. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Information Disclosure Statement, § 609(4), at 600-67.
38. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11338.
39. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11342.
40. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11342.
41. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11339.
42. See infra pp. 21-22.
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the applicant to disclose or cite prior art believed to be relevant to
the patentability.43
The Supreme Court initially recognized a technical fraud de-
fense for failure to cite material information in Precision Instrument
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.' In
Precision Instrument the patentee failed to disclose to the Patent
Office information regarding possible perjury in connection with a
settlement of an interference proceeding.45 The patentee was barred
from enforcing two patents as a result of this failure to disclose rele-
vant information; this breach of duty may be viewed as analogous to
failing to cite known relevant prior art.'
Since the decision in Precision Instrument, the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals and its predecessor the Federal Circuit,
expanded the affirmative duty of disclosure of relevant prior infor-
mation.47 Then, in 1977, the Patent Office went a step further in
promulgating Rule 56 which imposes a positive duty of disclosure
of material information that a reasonable Examiner would consider
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a
patent.48 This stringent standard of materiality was not derived
from prior case law on fraud and inequitable conduct, but was dis-
tilled from the law of securities regulation.4 9 In securities regula-
tion, a corporation soliciting proxies must disclose all information
that a reasonable stockholder would consider important.5 0 Appli-
cation of this rule to the patent realm has been criticized to the
extent that in securities applications such a harsh rule is justified to
43. 4 CHISUM, PATENTS, § 19.03[2], at 19-67 (1989).
44. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
45. "The Patent and Trademark Office may declare an interference when one patent
application claims substantially the same patentable invention as is claimed in one or more
other applications or issued patents. The purpose of an interference is to resolve the issue of
priority of invention." 1 CHIsuM, PATENTS, GI-10 (1989).
46. Cf. 4 CHISUM, PATENTS, § 19.03[2], at 19-68, n.l (1989).
47. See Wegner, Inequitable Conduct and the Proper Roles of Patent Attorney and Ex-
aminerin an Era ofInternational Patent Harmonization, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.A.Q.J. 38,
52-54 (1988).
48. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
49. Lee, Introduction: The Special Ad Hoc A.LP.LA. Committee on Rule 56 and the
Evolution of Proposed Rule 57, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.A.Q.J. 1, 3 (1988). The court in In
re Harita, 847 F.2d 801, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930 (Fed. Cir. 1988) makes clear that it is not
operating under a traditional fraudulent procurement standard. The court indicated that it is
a mischaracterization to call Rule 56 a "codification" because in fact it inaugurated an en-
tirely new manner of prosecuting patent applications. It effectively made applicants and their
attorneys partners with the Patent Office Examiners in producing a record of the prior art.
Id. at 808, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
50. Lee, Introduction: The Special Ad Hoc A.IP.LA. Committee on Rule 56 and the
Evolution of Proposed Rule 57, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.A.Q.J. 1, 3 (1988).
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protect uninformed stockholders; by contrast, given the nature of
their position, patent Examiners should be well informed, if not ex-
perts, on the matter before them. Subsequent to enactment of
Rule 56, the Federal Circuit in JP. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex,
Ltd.,52 adopted the term "inequitable conduct." The same court
entertained an evolving view that patent law involves notions of
morality.5 3
The Federal Circuit's approach at that point in time was to
balance materiality and scienter. The threshold of materiality was
the Rule 56 standard of whether there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable Examiner would consider the reference important
in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. 54
The threshold of scienter was gross negligence.55
The questions of materiality and scienter were viewed as inter-
twined, "[S]o that a lesser showing of the materiality of withheld
information may suffice when an intentional scheme to defraud is
established, whereas a greater showing of the materiality of with-
held information would necessarily create an inference that its non-
disclosure was wrongful.",56  Thus, an intent to mislead was
inferable from the materiality of the withheld reference. 5
This standard encouraged a deluge of charges of inequitable
conduct. Estimates indicate that the defense of inequitable conduct
was raised in approximately 80% of all patent infringement cases. 58
The Federal Circuit has objected to the prevalent use of the fraudu-
lent procurement defense, stating that fraud is a "[Mluch-abused
and too often last-resort allegation" 59 and that it "is cluttering up
51. Id.
52. 747 F.2d 1553, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
822 (1985).
53. See Chism, Patent Law and the Presumption of Moral Regularity: A Critical Review
of Recent Federal Circuit Decisions on Inequitable Conduct and Willful Infringement, 69 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 27 (1987).
54. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 763 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
55. W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1558, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
303, 317 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
56. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 763, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
57. Argus Chemical Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 10, 14, 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1100, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
58. Hoffman, The Duty of Disclosure Requirements, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.A.Q.J.
124, 127 (1988).
59. Preemption Devices, Inc. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 732 F.2d 903, 908, 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 841, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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the patent system."0
As a result of these developments, the Patent Office has re-
cently proposed a new standard of materiality and disclosure proce-
dure.61 Furthermore, in a Notice dated September 8, 1988, the
Commissioner indicated that it would no longer investigate and re-
ject original or Reissue applications under Rule 56.62
Thus, at present "[T]he court will scrutinize charges of fraud
very closely and will be disinclined to uphold an inequitable con-
duct defense in the absence of truly egregious conduct, such as falsi-
fication of data, or an admission of intent to deceive."63
2. Present Approach
The two-prong balancing of materiality and scienter has been
modified with a test set forth by the Federal Circuit in FMC Corp. v.
Manitowoc Co., Inc..6  This prevailing test is articulated by the
court as follows:
To be guilty of inequitable conduct, one must have intended to
act inequitably. Thus, one who alleges a "failure to disclose"
form of inequitable conduct must offer clear and convincing
proof of: (1) prior art or information that is material; (2) knowl-
edge chargeable to applicant of that prior art or information and
of its materiality; and (3) failure of the applicant to disclose the
art or information resulting from an intent to mislead the PTO.
That proof may be rebutted by a showing that: (a) the prior art
or information was not material (e.g., because it is less pertinent
than or merely cumulative with prior art or information cited to
or by the PTO); (b) if the prior art or information was material, a
showing that applicant did not know of that art or information;
(c) if applicant did know of that art or information, a showing
that applicant did know of its materiality; (d) a showing that ap-
plicant's failure to disclose art or information did not result from
an intent to mislead the PTO. Thus, a balancing of overlapping
considerations is involved, in view of all the circumstances, the
presence or absence of inequitable conduct. The level of materi-
ality may be high or low.... [Ain applicant must be chargeable
with knowledge of the materiality of the art or information; yet
an applicant who knew of the art or information cannot inten-
60. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454, 223 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 603 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
61. See supra pp. 3-8.
62. "Patent and Trademark Office Implementation of 37 C.F.R. 1.56" 1096 O.G. 16
(Oct. 16, 1988).
63. R. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 29 (1988).
64. 835 F.2d 1411, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1112 (1987).
1991]
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tionally avoid learning of its materiality through gross negli-
gence, i.e., it may be found that the applicant "should have
known" of that materiality.65
The FMC test utilizes familiar terminology: element (1) inquires
into "material information," while element (2) queries as to
"knowledge chargeable to applicant," and element (3) examines the
applicant's "intent to mislead." Thus, element (1) embraces a mate-
riality standard while elements (2) and (3) embrace the concept of
scienter. Therefore, to illuminate the FMC test, consideration turns
to how the court has previously interpreted the terms materiality
and scienter.
a. Materiality
The Federal Circuit has made clear that the guiding principle
in determining materiality of a nondisclosed prior art reference is
the Patent Office standard articulated in Rule 56: whether there is
"[A] substantial likelihood that a reasonable Examiner would have
considered the nondisclosed information important in deciding
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. '66 While the
court starts at this point, in FMC67 it indicated that materiality
alone would not suffice to sustain a finding of inequitable conduct.
Rather, the court required evidence of intent to mislead the Patent
Office, in addition to evidence of the materiality of the withheld
reference. 8
Thus, the Court is presently requiring a relatively high level of
materiality to sustain a finding of inequitable conduct. Moreover, if
the Patent Office's proposed Rule 57 is adopted, the standard of
materiality would be even higher.6 9
Mindful of the trend diminishing the import of a finding of
materiality without intent, and the possibility of a new materiality
standard, it is helpful to highlight prior interpretations of the mate-
riality standard.
As a starting point, it is clear that a reference need not antici-
pate or render obvious the claimed invention for it to be material.70
However, the superiority of the claimed invention in contrast to the
65. Id. at 1415, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115-16.
66. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 763, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l. Trade Comm'n.,
808 F.2d 1471, 1481, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
67. 835 F.2d 1411, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1112 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
68. Id. at 1415, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
69. See supra pp. 3-5.
70. A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392, 1397, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 849,
[Vol. 7
PATENT PRACTICE
withheld reference does not indicate that such a reference is nonma-
terial.7 1 Although a prior art reference is a "starting point" for a
patented design and "may be some evidence of materiality," this is
not enough to establish materiality where there are significant and
nonobvious differences between the reference and the patented
design. 72
It is clearly established that cumulative references are not ma-
terial.73 However, a prior art device which is the only reference of
record disclosing each of the structural elements of the claimed in-
vention is not cumulative.74
Where one encounters a reference which is in a class previously
searched by the Examiner, it cannot be presumed that the Examiner
considered and discarded the reference as being nonmaterial.7 5
Similarly, it is inappropriate for an applicant to dismiss a material
reference on the assumption that the Examiner is cognizant of the
reference because he had cited it during the examination of a prior
patent.76  Likewise, disclosure of material art in one application
before the Patent Office does not negate gross negligence in failing
to disclose that reference in another application.77
b. Scienter
FMC sets forth that one must establish knowledge chargeable
to applicant of material prior art or information and an intent to
mislead the Patent Office by not disclosing the art or information.78
Thus, the court is divorcing itself from earlier decisions which infer
intent from gross negligence.79 The Federal Circuit sitting en banc
853 (Fed. Cir. 1986). This would not change under the proposed rules. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
71. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1682 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
72. Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 800 F.2d 1111, 1114, 231
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 67, 69 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
73. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60, 223
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
74. Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1214,2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
2015, 2019-20 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
75. Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 751 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
76. FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
77. Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1214-15, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 2015, 2020 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
78. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
79. See In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 891, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 530, 533 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
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has clarified some of its recent precedent and applied a more strin-
gent standard for finding intent:
Some of our opinions have suggested that a finding of gross negli-
gence compels a finding of an intent to deceive.... Others have
indicated that gross negligence alone does not mandate a finding
of intent to deceive. . . . 'Gross negligence' has been used as a
label for various patterns of conduct. It is definable, however,
only in terms of a particular act or acts viewed in light of all the
circumstances. We adopt the view that a finding that particular
conduct amounts to 'gross negligence' does not of itself justify an
inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in
light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good
faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of
intent to deceive.80
This language should serve as the touchstone in future cases. Never-
theless, certain principles from previous cases will remain. For in-
stance, failure to cite a reference known to be material to a
cancelled broader claim will likely be deemed gross negligence.8" A
finding of gross negligence is likely when an attorney fails to dis-
close a reference yet instructs a foreign associate prosecuting a cor-
responding foreign application to amend claims to avoid the same
uncited reference.82 Intent to mislead must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.8 3
C. Determining What References to Disclose
Having set forth the applicable disclosure rules, their possible
modifications, the development of the case law interpreting inequi-
table conduct, specific cases addressing recurring circumstances,
and the developing approach of the Federal Circuit, the question
still remains: what should be disclosed? Unfortunately there is no
simple response to this inquiry. The decision is contingent upon the
factual circumstances before the practitioner. During prosecution,
when in doubt, disclose the reference. This rule is not so easily ap-
plied after receiving a Notice of Allowance. In this circumstance
prosecution has formally ended and therefore the reference is not
welcomed by the Examiner. Moreover, submittal of the reference
80. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
81. Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 884-85, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 750-51 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
82. In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 891,229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 530, 533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
83. Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1559, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1772, 1777 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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may result in delay of the issuance of a client's valuable patent
rights.
The patent prosecutor should bear in mind the background
material developed in this section. The gravamen of the cases and
proposed rules is to relax the possibility of liability being imposed
for failing to disclose references. Nevertheless, from the client's
standpoint it is preferable that the Patent Office have considered as
much art as possible to discourage future challenges to the patent.
On the other hand, this may lead to lengthy delays in the ultimate
issuance of a patent.
The primary inquiry in determining whether to disclose a ref-
erence after Notice of Allowance is the materiality of the reference.
Naturally, if the reference compels amendment to the claims, the
reference must be brought to the attention of the Office. Similarly,
if the reference represents a bar to patentability, it must be brought
to the attention of the Office. •
In those cases where the reference does not impose a duty to
amend the claims one must consider whether the reference is cumu-
lative. It seems that any uncited prior art reference that discloses a
claimed feature or combination of features not previously disclosed
in a reference of record must be brought to the Patent Office's atten-
tion, even if the claim or claims in question comprise a number of
features not found in the cited reference or any of the prior art of
record. Certainly a newly discovered reference that addresses a key
feature of the invention not disclosed in the prior art of record must
be disclosed, even if that means refiling the application. In short,
the safest approach for the practitioner is to cite a particular newly
discovered reference unless all of the claimed features in that single
reference already appear in a single reference of record.
A reference which serves as the basis for a rejection in a corre-
sponding foreign application should be cited to the Office. How-
ever, it should be borne in mind that the peculiarities of the patent
laws of the foreign country may make the reference inapplicable
under United States law. 4
Any decision not to cite a reference which is included in your
own fie should be documented with a memo to the file articulating
the particular reasons for not citing the reference.
The following section explores the mechanics of submitting art
after Notice of Allowance. The guiding principle that emerges is
84. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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that the applicable procedure is contingent upon the materiality of
the reference and the temporal proximity to issuance.
III. DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AFTER NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE
A. Compliance Prior to Paying Issue Fee
The approach to be pursued in this time period, as the ap-
proach to be pursued in the time periods to be subsequently ana-
lyzed, is contingent upon the materiality of the newly discovered
reference. The degree of materiality compels three different ap-
proaches to subsequent prosecution: (1) submission of the reference
along with extensive amendments; (2) submission of the reference
accompanied by minor amendments; and (3) submission of the ref-
erence without amendment.
When the materiality of the newly discovered reference dic-
tates that the reference not only be submitted, but be submitted
with extensive amendment to preserve the patentability of the al-
lowed claims, then one will most likely be forced to pursue a File
Wrapper Continuation Procedure pursuant to 37 C.F.R. section
1.62.85 Under this procedure, examination on the merits of the in-
vention will be reinitiated. In the best case, the client will be forced
to wait, at a minimum, several months before the invention will
once again be in a condition for Allowance. In a worst case scena-
rio, the materiality and the resultant extensive amendments may al-
together preclude Allowance of the claims.
In the case of a material reference compelling only minor
amendment to the allowed claims, once again one may be forced to
initiate a File Wrapper Continuation Procedure. Alternatively, if
the issues presented by the reference are limited and particularized,
there is a potential option. While not a matter of right, 37 C.F.R.
section 1.312(a) (hereinafter Rule 312(a)) does provide that any
amendment filed before payment of the issue fee may be entered on
the recommendation of the Primary Examiner and upon approval
of the Commissioner.8 6
It should be emphasized that any amendment changing the
scope of the claims, as hypothesized herein, requires approval of the
85. See generally M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Types of Applications, § 201.
86. 37 C.F.R. § 1.312(a) (1990) states:
No amendment may be made as a matter of right in an application after the
mailing of the Notice of Allowance. Any amendment pursuant to this para-
graph filed before the payment of the issue fee may be entered on the recom-
mendation of the primary examiner, approved by the Commissioner, without
withdrawing the case from issue.
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Primary Examiner and the Commissioner. 7 Such approval is not
generously meted out. Indeed, any amendment affecting the disclo-
sure, the scope of any claim, or which adds a claim must be supple-
mented by a statement setting forth: (1) why the amendment is
needed; (2) why the proposed amended or new claims require no
additional search or examination; (3) why the claims are patentable;
and (4) why they were not earlier presented.88
If the amendments are not obviously allowable, entry is un-
likely. The Office will refuse entry of the amendment for any of the
following reasons: (1) an additional search is required; (2) more
than a cursory review of the record is necessary; or (3) the amend-
ment would involve substantial additional work on the part of the
Office.89
The Office is resistant to this procedure; however, it potentially
leads to the most satisfactory result from the client's standpoint-
prompt issuance of its patent. If the procedure fails, one must turn
to the File Wrapper Continuation procedure as previously
discussed.
In the final case, submission of a material reference without
amendment, once again File Wrapper Continuation procedure may
be employed, indeed may be necessary for a highly relevant refer-
ence; however, if the reference is not highly relevant, the File Wrap-
per Continuation procedure's concomitant shortcomings may be
avoided by a cumbersome but effective alternative procedure. This
procedure, which is set out in the MPEP,90 stipulates that after
claims have been allowed the Examiner is not required to consider
any citation which is not accompanied by:
(a) A proposed amendment cancelling or further restricting at
least one independent claim and narrowing the scope of protec-
tion sought; (b) A timely affidavit under 37 CFR 1.131 with re-
spect to the material cited; or (c) A statement by the applicant or
his attorney or agent that, in the judgment of the person making
the statement, the information cited (1) raises a serious question
as to the patentability of the claimed subject matter, or (2) is
closer than that of record, or (3) is material to the examination of
the application as defined in 37 CFR 1.56(a) and is filed with an
87. Id.
88. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Amendments After Notice of Allowance, 37 CFR 1.312,
§ 714.16, at 700-73.
89. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Amendments After Notice of Allowance, 37 CFR L312,
§ 714.16, at 700-73.
90. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Information Disclosure Statement, § 609(4), at 600.
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explanation as to why the information disclosure statement was
not earlier presented.
If the late submission is predicated upon element (a), the reference
must be accompanied by a Rule 312(a) amendment, as previously
discussed.
It should be emphasized that the reason for the delay in sub-
mission of the reference will be closely scrutinized. Any dilatory
activity on the attorney's behalf will eliminate this option. Simi-
larly, any dilatory activity by the attorney's foreign associate in
bringing the reference to the attention of the applicant will also
eliminate this option. Thus, a patent prosecutor is well advised to
stress to foreign associates the importance of prompt communica-
tion of references cited in a foreign application. Similarly, one
should have an expedited process in one's own office for promptly
considering prior art cited in a corresponding foreign application.
If one does not act with dispatch, this option may be eliminated and
the applicant may be forced to submit the reference in a Continua-
tion application.
In addition to adhering to the foregoing steps propounded by
the Patent Office, as a practical matter, it is advisable to undertake
the following informal steps. First, phone the Examiner and ap-
prise him of the new reference and the circumstances surrounding
its late discovery. Afterwards, make copies of the foregoing materi-
als which were formally filed with the Patent Office along with cop-
ies of the application, amendments, office actions, and the original
references. Once these materials are gathered, have them hand car-
ried directly to the Examiner.
This additional informal procedure is undertaken for practical
reasons. Once the application has been allowed, the file is not kept
with the examining group.9" As a result, the fie is not readily ac-
cessible to the Examiner. By directly providing this information in-
formally to the Examiner, he is in a more convenient position to
expediently consider and enter the art before issuance of the patent.
It may be advisable to pay the issue fee only shortly before its
due date. Prompt payment does not accelerate issuance of a patent
which is mechanically issued with its assigned batch. By waiting,
one may preserve the opportunity to cite subsequently discovered
art. Also, as a practical matter, one should utilize a checklist of
matters to be considered before paying the issue fee. Of course, one
91. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Jurisdiction, § 1305.
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such matter should be to check foreign and companion cases for
recently cited prior art.
B. Compliance After Payment of the Issue Fee but Prior to
Issuance of a Patent Number and Issue Date
The procedures for submitting newly discovered references are
altered once the issue fee has been paid. These procedures are exer-
cised in a limited time frame since a patent number and issue date
are typically assigned to an application approximately two weeks
after the issue fee is received in the Patent Office.92 Thus, the ap-
proaches undertaken in this time period are relevant only for a few
weeks. Once the issue date and patent number are assigned, still
another approach is undertaken, as to be considered in the subse-
quent section.
In the case of a material reference requiring extensive amend-
ment, one must Petition for Withdrawal of the Issuance of the ap-
plication pursuant to 37 C.F.R. section 1.313(a).93 A Petition for
Withdrawal pursuant to this section must be accompanied by a
showing of good and sufficient reasons why the withdrawal is neces-
sary and a fee.9
It is the explicit policy of the Patent Office to permit an appli-
cation to be withdrawn from issue in order to fie a Continuing ap-
plication unless the application to be withdrawn is itself a
Continuing application.95 Thus, after the petition is fied, one may
file a Continuation application and continue prosecution in light of
the new reference.
In the case of a material reference requiring minor amend-
ments to the allowed application, a number of steps are taken.
First, one should immediately call the Issue Branch and request
that the application not be assigned an issue date and patent
number. This call should be immediately supplemented with a let-
92. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Practice After Payment of Issue Fee, § 1306.03.
93. 37 C.F.R. § 1.313(a) states:
Applications may be withdrawn from issue for further action at the initiative of
the Office or upon petition by the applicant. Any such petition by the appli-
cant must include a showing of good and sufficient reasons why withdrawal of
the application is necessary and, if the reason for the withdrawal is not the
fault of the Office, must be accompanied by the fee set forth in § 1.17(i)(1). If
the application is withdrawn from issue, a new [N]otice of [A]llowance will be
sent if the application is again allowed. Any amendment accompanying a peti-
tion to withdraw an application from issue must comply with the requirements
of § 1.312.
94. Id. The fee under § 1.17(i)(1) is presently 120 dollars.
95. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Withdrawal From Issue, § 1308.
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ter reiterating the substance of the telephone conference. Finally,
one proceeds pursuant to 37 C.F.R. section 1.312(b) (hereinafter
Rule 312(b)), the post issue fee counterpart of Rule 312(a).96 In
addition to the requirements under Rule 312(a), as discussed above,
under Rule 312(b) one must submit a fee and a showing of good and
sufficient reasons why the amendment is necessary and was not ear-
lier presented. If the petition and amendment are rejected, the ap-
plicant is forced to pursue the approach of the previous paragraph;
that is, to Petition for Withdrawal under Rule 313(a) and file a Con-
tinuation application.
In the third case, a material reference which does not require
amendment, the procedure is similar to that outlined in the previous
section on Compliance Prior to Paying the Issue Fee. However, in
addition, the information must also be accompanied by a petition
under Rule 312(b) (which includes a fee) and a showing of good and
sufficient reasons why the submission was not earlier submitted.97
According to the MPEP, "Such a petition, if granted, would
result in review of the art by the Examiner and possible entry of the
material."9" If the material is not entered, it is believed that the
attorney has nevertheless complied with his duty of disclosure.
Whether such unentered art should be considered in a Reexamina-
tion proceeding will be subject to discussion in the following
section.
C. Compliance After a Patent Number and Issue Date have
been Assigned but Prior to Issuance
As previously indicated, a patent number and issue date are
generally assigned to an application approximately within two
weeks after the issue fee is received in the Patent Office.99 This
event, in turn, starts a printing routine that takes about eight
weeks.l°°
If, within this time frame, a material reference requiring sub-
stantial amendments of the allowed claims is discovered, the appli-
cant's options are narrowly circumscribed. As set out in 37 C.F.R.
96. 37 C.F.R. § 1.312(b) states:
Any amendment pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section [supra note 86] filed
after the date the issue fee is paid must be accompanied by a petition including
the fee set forth in § 1.17(i) and a showing of good and sufficient reasons why
the amendment is necessary and was not earlier presented.
97. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Information Disclosure Statement, § 609(4).
98. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Information Disclosure Statement, at 600-66.
99. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
100. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Practice After Payment of Issue Fee, § 1306.03.
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section 1.313(b), in these circumstances a patent will not be with-
drawn from issue for any reason except (1) mistake on the part of
the Office; (2) violation of Rule 56 or illegality in the application;
(3) unpatentability of one or more claims; or (4) for an
interference. o0
If one is able to meet one of these stringent standards a subse-
quent Continuation application may be filed. However, realisti-
cally, at this juncture the application has all but issued and the
options are the same as those available in post issuance cases, which
will be discussed in the next section.
When a material reference requiring minor amendments is dis-
covered at this late juncture, the options are the same as those
presented when extensive amendments are required. On the other
hand, a material reference which does not require amendment may
plausibly be entered up to several days before the actual issue date.
In this case, one follows the analogous procedure for submitting a
material reference without amendment, as set forth in the previous
section addressing the procedure prior to assignment of a patent
number and date."02 It is important here, as before, to provide the
Examiner with a duplicate set of documents, informally, so that he
is not inconvenienced.
D. Compliance Under the Proposed Rules
The proposed rules, as set forth above, 103 will largely eliminate
or drastically reduce the practice of having newly discovered prior
art considered by the Examiner after Allowance. Thus, the various
courses of action available under present practice will usually be
replaced by a single option: filing of a File Wrapper Continuation
application. Indeed, part of the proposed rules is an amendment to
Rule 313(b) which would allow one to withdraw an application
from issue after the issue fee has been paid for the express purpose
of considering material information in a continuing application.'
°4
Elimination of the option to submit art after Allowance, with-
out filing of a Continuation application, is a dramatic change in pol-
101. 37 C.F.R. § 1.313(b) states:
When the issue fee has been paid, and the patent to be issued has received its
issue date and patent number, the application will not be withdrawn from issue
for any reason except (1) mistake on the part of the Office, (2) a violation of
§ 1.56 or illegality in the application, (3) unpatentability of one or more claims,
or (4) for interference.
102. See supra pp. 18-20.
103. See supra pp. 3-8.
104. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11343.
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icy and is certain -to cause hardship. On the other hand, if the
higher standard of materiality is utilized, the practitioner will not be
obliged to disclose as much art. That is, a reference of lower mate-
riality which can be entered after Allowance under present proce-
dure, may not have to be disclosed at all under the proposed rules.
However, as a practical matter, most practitioners will likely con-
tinue to follow the Rule 56 requirements in order to "play it safe."
Therefore, even a reference that is material under the present rule,
but might not be under the proposed rule, may compel a File Wrap-
per Continuation procedure.
The rule prohibiting disclosures of references after Allowance
is not absolute in terms. First, the Examiner may allow an addi-
tional time period to permit an applicant who has made a bona fide
attempt to comply with Rule 98, to provide any information which
was inadvertently omitted. For example, an Examiner may allow
additional time to submit a single patent which has been acciden-
tally omitted from an earlier disclosure statement.1 05 The require-
ment for inadvertency, however, by its terms does not include art
which is subsequently discovered during the post issuance period.
Submission of art after Allowance is feasible, "In the event that a
final Office action is withdrawn or a Notice of Allowance is re-
scinded, [in which case] any information disclosure statement that
had not been filed in a timely manner would be acceptable if timely
resubmitted and otherwise proper in form and content."106 As a
practical matter, this provision is of limited utility since the reason
for withdrawal of the Notice of Allowance must be independent of
the practitioner's discovery of material art.
From the authors' perspective, the patent bar is generally in
favor of changing the standard of materiality to that which is
promulgated in proposed Rule 57. On the other hand, concern has
been voiced over the mandatory requirement of a disclosure state-
ment within three months of the filing date and the fee of $200 for
any late statement. Similarly, the three month grace period from
the time of the foreign office action has been the subject of concern
since this period provides little time to obtain a translation, consider
its materiality, and forward it to the Patent Office. Finally, there
appears to be resistance to the evisceration of after Allowance
practice.
There is also the consideration of whether the courts will even
follow the higher materiality standard in the proposed rules. Evi-
105. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11342.
106. 54 Fed. Reg., supra note 15, at 11339.
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dence suggests that the proposed standard would in fact be ob-
served. The Federal Circuit adopted the present standard
propounded by the Patent Office. Moreover, the objective "but for"
test is closely intertwined with intent, an element in which that
court has recently shown increased interest.107 In other words, the
Federal Circuit already appears to be moving toward the standard
proposed by the Patent Office. '
IV. PROBLEMATIC PRIOR ART AFTER ISSUANCE
A. Reexamination
The Reexamination statute was promulgated in 1980 in order
to revive the competitive position of United States industry by re-
storing "investor confidence in the certainty of patent rights." 109
The Reexamination procedure permits "[T]he owner of a patent to
have the validity of his patent tested in the Patent Office where the
most expert opinions exist and at a much reduced cost.., and
help[s] restore confidence in the effectiveness of our patent
system."110
The Reexamination statute provides that any person may at
any time cite to the Patent Office prior art consisting of patents or
printed publications which are believed to bear on the patentability
of any claims of an issued patent.11 Within three months of a re-
quest for Reexamination, the Commissioner will determine whether
"a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of
the patent concerned is raised by the request."11 2
A negative determination serves as prima facie evidence that
the cited art is not material.I" A positive determination initiates an
examination procedure which is undertaken with "special dis-
patch."1 1 4 Generally, the Examiner who acted on the issuing patent
presides over the Reexamination procedure. 5 Normally, the sec-
107. See supra pp. 11-14.
108. Id.
109. 3 CHISUM, PATENTS, § 11.07[4], at 11-115 (1989).
110. Id.
111. See generally M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Citation of Prior Art and Reexamination of
Patents, § 2200. There is also a procedure for citing prior art relevant to an issued patent. 37
C.F.R. § 1.501 (1990). However, this procedure does not result in the Patent Office's consid-
eration of the art, only its entry into the File Wrapper. Consequently, it is of limited utility
from the patentee's standpoint of insuring the validity of its patent in light of the reference.
112. 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(a).
113. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
114. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Special Status for Action, § 2261.
115. "According to the statistics collected by the PTO through August 31, 1986, 54% of
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ond action in a Reexamination proceeding is final.116 Since there is
no File Wrapper Continuation procedure, the final action is of
greater import than in a Reissue proceeding.
The Patent Office will not undertake a Reexamination proceed-
ing if the same reference was the subject of litigation.117 Generally,
a court will stay litigation to accommodate a Reexamination pro-
ceeding;' 18 however, recently a district court refused to stay entry of
its judgment on patentability to await the PTO determination in a
Reexamination proceeding. 119 In a similar holding, the Federal
Circuit refused to stay a Reexamination proceeding in the Patent
Office in view of litigation involving the same patent and prior
art. 1
20
The issue of intervening rights arises in the context of Reexam-
ination, as in Reissue. 121 Also common to both types of proceed-
ings is a duty of disclosure. 122 Reexamination is especially helpful
to the patentee if he is uncertain as to the materiality of a reference.
The procedure allows the patentee to submit the reference to the
Patent Office which can make the final determination as to its mate-
riality. It should also be borne in mind that a third party may initi-
ate a Reexamination proceeding. 123 By initiating the proceeding,
the third party is entitled to make a statement regarding patentabil-
ity.124 To diminish the possibility of a third party enjoying this
privilege, it may be prudent for the patentee to act promptly by
initiating a Reexamination proceeding upon discovery of a material
reference. 125
the Reexaminations in the PTO are conducted by the same examiner who was involved with
the application upon which the patent issued." Speranza, Reexamination - The Patent Chal-
lenger's View, 15 Am. INTELL. PROP. L.A.Q.J. 85 (1987).
116. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, FinalAction, § 2271.
117. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Reexamination and Relitigation Proceedings, § 2286.
118. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Reexamination and Relitigation Proceedings, § 2286.
119. Du Pont v. Phillips, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1411-12 (D.C. Del. 1989).
120. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1989).
122. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Information Disclosure Statement and Other Information,
§ 1418 and Duty of Disclosure in Reexamination Proceedings, § 2280.
123. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Persons Who May File a Request, § 2212.
124. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Statement Applying Prior Art, § 2217.
125. Note that the third party may subsequently request a Reexamination as to the same
art. See Lowin, Comment: Reexamination "Catch 22," 14 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.A.Q.J. 226
(1986). However, as a practical matter, once the Patent Office has considered a particular
reference, it is not likely that the same reference will subsequently raise a substantial question
of patentability.
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B. Reissue
In 1977 the Patent Office promulgated 37 C.F.R. section
1.175(a)(4) (hereinafter Rule 175(a)(4)) to enable a patent owner to
apply for a Reissue without the customary allegation of a defect in
the issued patent and without the standard alteration of the claims
and specification.126 This resulted in a procedure tantamount to
Reexamination. In 1982, two years after enactment of Reexamina-
tion procedures, the Patent Office eliminated Rule 175(a)(4), this
so-called "no defect" Reissue application.
Thus, Reissue may be utilized as a method for securing Reex-
amination of patentability only where the patentee is willing to
highlight some error or defect in the issued patent and makes
amendments to address those errors or defects. The trend of the
decisions is to read "error" liberally, including for example errors of
judgment, law and fact.127 However, discovery of an additional ref-
erence would not in itself constitute an error within the meaning of
the statute.
The Reissue procedure is an important safety-valve in the case
where one has inadvertently failed to claim priority or to reference a
copending application. Correcting the patent in this context is im-
perative if a subsequently discovered reference would otherwise
serve as a bar. Reexamination does not provide a comparable
mechanism for correcting patents.
Reissue is broader in scope than Reexamination insofar as it is
not limited to patents and printed publications; that is, any other
possible obstacles the patentee wishes to test against his patent may
be presented to the Patent Office in a Reissue proceeding. For in-
stance, evidence as to on sale activity may be considered in a Reis-
sue proceeding (assuming the other Reissue requirements are met)
while such evidence is not presentable in a Reexamination
proceeding..
Reissue may also be attractive to the patentee from a proce-
dural standpoint. Reissue practice includes an option to fie a File
Wrapper Continuation application, such an option is not available
in a Reexamination context.1 28 Consequently, the patentee argua-
bly has a better opportunity to secure the most appropriate claims.
Of course, Reissue alone allows for the broadening of claims within
two years from issuance. 129
126. 3 CHISUM, PATENTS, § 15.03[1][ii], at 15-39 (1989).
127. Id. § 15.03[1][e].
128. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, After Final Practice, § 2272.
129. 35 U.S.C. § 251.
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It is unclear whether a patentee may obtain a Reissue to cor-
rect a defect based on prior art if he or his attorney were aware of
the prior art during the original prosecution and failed to take ad-
vantage of a procedure or remedy available in the Patent Office to
correct the defect.'3 ' For instance, it is unclear whether one may be
precluded from filing for a Reissue in order to narrow claims in
light of prior art discovered prior to issuance of the original patent
when the patentee failed to have that art considered through a File
Wrapper Continuation procedure. No such uncertainty exists with
Reexamination.
There are a number of shortcomings associated with the Reis-
sue procedure. First, the Reissue oath is burdensome and is often
the subject of initial rejection and subsequent amendment. Next,
the Reissue examination procedure is expedited by its special status,
nevertheless it is not as rapid as its Reexamination counterpart.3
Finally, since Reissue proceedings, unlike Reexamination proceed-
ings, are not limited to specific patents and publications, all issues of
patentability may be re-challenged. This may lead to protracted
prosecution which invites opportunities for File Wrapper Estoppel.
Otherwise, the two examination procedures are very similar,
for instance, under both procedures the original Examiner will
probably be responsible for examination in the subsequent proceed-
ing. ' 2 Also, the duty of disclosure is applicable in each proceed-
ing 133 and the opportunities for staying litigation are generally
consistent. 3 4 Likewise, intervening rights are equally applicable to
both procedures.135
Under both procedures, the files are open to the public. 136 The
Reexamination challenger is afforded the opportunity to submit a
statement regarding patentability, and potentially an additional re-
buttal statement. 137 Under Reissue procedure, the fling of Reissue
applications are announced in the Official Gazette. 13' The an-
130. 3 CHISUM, PATENTS, § 15.03[2][d], at 15-44.9 (1989).
131. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Special Status, § 1442 and Special Status for Action,
§ 2261.
132. See M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Examination of Reissue Application, § 1440 and supra
note 115.
133. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.175(a)(7), 1.555.
134. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Special Status, § 1442 and Reexamination and Litigation
Proceedings, § 2286.
135. 35 U.S.C. § 307(b).
136. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Reissue Files Open to the Public and Notice of Filing Reis-
sue Announced in Official Gazette, § 1430 and Public Access, § 2232.
137. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.510, 1.535.
138. 37 C.F.R. § 1.176.
[Vol. 7
PATENT PRACTICE
nouncement serves to allow members of the public an opportunity
to submit to the Examiner information pertinent to the patentability
of the Reissue application. 139 Generally, the public has two months
in which to submit such information, although a procedure is pro-
vided for waiving this time limitation."14 This open ended invita-
tion to the public encourages meddlesome interference with
expedited examination. Information pertinent to the patentability
of the Reissue application may occur in a variety of forms.14' Thus,
the patentee may be burdened by attempting to dismiss a plurality
of attacks upon patentability which would otherwise not be
presented in a request for Reexamination.
C. Reexamination/Reissue v. Litigation
Art discovered after Allowance of claims may be utilized to
challenge those claims in different forums. The art may be used in
court as a challenge to validity. Alternatively, the art may be used
before the Patent Office in a Reexamination or Reissue proceeding.
This section explores Reexamination and Reissue as pre-litigation
strategies.
A salient feature favoring Reexamination or Reissue over liti-
gation is that it represents a relatively expedited and inexpensive
mechanism to test patent validity.' 42
Another benefit of pursuing Reexamination or Reissue is the
largely ex parte nature of the proceeding. As discussed, a patent
challenger is entitled to limited participation in Reexamination and
Reissue proceedings. 43 Absent the ex parte rigor of cross-examina-
tion and rebuttal affidavits, the patentee is placed in a favorable po-
sition. In addition, it is probable that the initial Examiner will be
placed in charge of the Reexamination or Reissue proceeding.'"
The Examiner may not be inclined to invalidate a patent he once
approved. As a practical matter, a patent which has withstood a
Reexamination or which has been subject to dual prosecution as
with a Reissue patent, enjoys a presumption of validity which is
139. See M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Two-Month Delay Period, § 1441.
140. Id.
141. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) "On Sale" information, or 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c)
Petition to Strike Information, in addition to 35 U.S.C. § 103 prior art.
142. Speranza, Reexamination - The Patent Challenger's View, 15 AM. INTELL. PROP.
L.A.Q.J. 85 (1987) provides an excellent analysis of Reexamination versus litigation issue and
serves as the primary source of information in this section.
143. See supra pp. 23-27.
144. See supra note 115.
1991]
28 COMPUTER & tIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
more difficult to overcome.1 45
A party which holds a patent on an invention which is decep-
tively simple may find it advisable to reinforce it through a Patent
Office proceeding. The Patent Office is more likely to objectively
asses the merits of the invention, as opposed to a jury which is likely
to render a knee jerk reaction that "anyone could do that. ' 46 On
the other hand, a complex invention is likely to fare much better
before a jury which will be inclined to view something as patentable
if it cannot understand it. 147
A patentee may prefer to pursue a Patent Office proceeding if
the nature of the case dictates consideration of an abstruse patent
law concept. For instance, if there is a question of priority, with its
concomitant ramifications of sufficiency of disclosure in the original
application, this issue may be well-advised to be submitted to the
Patent Office for resolution.'4 The Patent Office is a favorable fo-
rum to the extent that claims can be amended to avoid
unpatentability.
A patentee must be cognizant of the advantages of a litigation
proceeding, as opposed to a Patent Office proceeding. In court the
patent is presumed valid.149 If the patent is to be invalidated it
must be done so by clear and convincing evidence. 150 Courts view
claims narrowly to uphold their validity. 5 ' On the other hand, in
the Patent Office there is no presumption of validity, and claims are
interpreted as broadly as their language reasonably permits. 5
In court, the patentee is entitled to initially present his case for
patentability. On the other hand, in the Patent Office, a Reexami-
nation challenger or a Reissue submittal may be the first statement
considered by the Examiner.
Reexamination serves as a potent weapon to the patent chal-
lenger in establishing materiality of a reference. Reexamination is
skewed toward finding materiality: Examiners are to find a "sub-
stantial new question" even if they would not necessarily reject
145. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 961, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
146. Speranza, Reexamination - The Patent Challenger's View, 15 AM. INTELL. PROP.
L.A.Q.J. 85 (1987).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
150. Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 138, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 644, 646 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
151. DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1322 n.2, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 758, 761 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
152. In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1548, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385, 388 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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claims over art.15 3 The patentee is barred from comment during the
decision on whether to reexamine, 154 a situation less favorable to
the patentee than being in court.
The ordering of Reexamination is strong evidence of material-
ity. This presumption is strengthened if a claim is later rejected,
and strengthened more if the claim is amended to overcome the re-
jection.1 55 As a result, the patentee may wish to initiate the Reex-
amination to diffuse any inference of inequitable conduct; moreover,
by initiating the procedure, the patentee precludes a hostile state-
ment by the patent challenger becoming a part of the file
wrapper. 156
V. CONCLUSION
Material prior art discovered after Allowance of claims in a
patent application presents special problems to a patent prosecutor.
In the case where the application has not yet issued into a patent,
the prosecutor would like the art considered by the Examiner before
the application issues, in order to avoid having to abandon the ap-
plication in favor of a Continuation. Moreover, the prosecutor is
bound to fulfill his or her duty of disclosure. In the case where the
application has issued before the material art was discovered, while
the prosecutor is not under a duty of disclosure, he or she may find
it advantageous to disclose the newly discovered art in a Reexami-
nation or Reissue proceeding.
The problems of subsequently discovered prior art have been
explored in this paper in the context of the evolving nature of the
patent prosecutor's duty of disclosure. The prosecutor's present
duty of disclosure is defined by Rule 56 which requires disclosure of
information which a reasonable Examiner would consider impor-
tant in deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent.
This standard, while stringent in its terms, has been increasingly
interpreted by the courts as leading to a finding of inequitable con-
duct only after egregious conduct. This judicial trend has been cou-
pled with a series of proposed rule changes. The proposed changes
alter the duty of disclosure to an objective "but for" standard and
mandate the filing of information disclosure statements. These pro-
153. M.P.E.P., supra note 32, Criteria for Deciding Request, § 2242.
154. 37 C.F.R. § 1.530.
155. Speranza, Reexamination - The Patent Challenger's View, 15 AM. INTELL. PROP.
L.A.Q.J. 85 (1988).
156. Id.
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posals would also drastically limit after Allowance practice in the
Patent Office.
The proposed rules have served to highlight the distinct nature
of current post Allowance practice. Post Allowance practice before
issuance of an application into a patent, as examined in this paper,
involves a variety of procedural alternatives contingent upon the
materiality of the reference and the temporal proximity to the appli-
cation's issuance. These alternatives have been set forth in detail,
while being augmented by pragmatic considerations and insights.
Post Allowance practice after issuance of the application into a
patent was also explored in this paper. Attention focused upon
practical and strategic considerations in choosing a Reissue or a Re-
examination procedure as a vehicle for bringing a material reference
to the attention of the Patent Office in lieu of testing the same refer-
ence in a litigation context.
